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It is striking to notice that Fichte intended the first written version of his Doctrine of 
Science (1794-95) “for his listeners,” namely for the students of the University of Jena where he 
had just taken up his post.  Fichte has in fact always believed that the ‘letter’ of the scientific 
exposition of his philosophy should come along with an oral explanation, thereby establishing a 
direct contact with his audience in order to avoid misunderstandings.  Throughout his career, he 
has been suspicious of the “written” word and this attitude explains at least in part the 
disagreement that took place between him and Schiller concerning the article “on the spirit and 
the letter in philosophy.” With Fichte, these two terms take a special meaning that illustrates, in 
an enlightening manner, the way he envisages transcendental philosophy and its mode of 
transmission.  
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Schiller had good reasons for being dissatisfied with the article that Fichte had sent him 
in the summer of 1975 for publication in the journal Die Horen. As is well known, the dispute 
that erupted between the two men following Schiller’s critical remarks led Fichte to give up 
publishing his text in Schiller’s journal. It must be said that the latter was in a particularly bad 
position to judge the article, entitled “On the spirit and the letter in philosophy,” for the simple 
reason that Fichte had provided him, at first, with just the three first sections of a text that would 
eventually comprise ten. Thus, Schiller was forced to base his judgment on a mere fragment of a 
text whose true length he did not know, and as a result he could not fathom the novelty and 
originality of Fichte’s argument.   
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In what follows, I have no intention of systematically reconstructing the debate between 
Fichte and Schiller, as their philosophical dispute has already been abundantly documented and 
commentated. However, I would like to bring out two points in Fichte’s argument that 
particularly perplexed Schiller, leading him to send the text back together with requests for 
clarification. For instance, Schiller told his correspondent that he was having trouble in grasping 
the meaning of the word “spirit.” He admitted to wondering “how you intend to connect the 
spirit in Goethe’s works – which, judging from the title of your essay, one would hardly have 
expected – to the spirit in the philosophies of Kant or Leibniz?”1 Schiller regarded Fichte’s 
choice of the term “spirit” as a kind of semantic shift – or salto mortale, as he called it – between 
the “spirit” animating the literary productions of a Goethe and the “spirit” in philosophy. To put 
it plainly, Schiller refused to countenance a spirit as the source of philosophical thinking. On the 
contrary, the spirit can only be one topic among others in philosophy, i.e., a mere object of 
presentation (Darstellung). He rejected the idea that speculative reflection springs from a 
philosophical spirit in the same way that an artwork flows from the aesthetic spirit.2  
The other objection that Schiller raised against Fichte seems at first sight like a simple 
semantic correction or qualification, yet we shall see that it is particularly telling: “You entitle 
your article ‘On the letter and the spirit in philosophy’, yet the first three sections deal 
exclusively with the spirit in the fine arts, which, as far as I know, is something completely 
different from the opposite of the letter.”3 Here Schiller was attempting to give Fichte a lesson in 
semantics, drawing a sharp distinction between the spirit vis-à-vis the letter on the one hand and 
the spirit that animates artistic works on the other. Indeed, in the first case, the spirit/letter pair 
pertains to the interpretation of texts, insofar as it is possible to understand a piece of writing in 
two ways, either according to its general intention or gist, i.e., its spirit, or else by adhering to a 
meticulous and servile reading of what the text explicitly stipulates, i.e., its letter. The terms 
                                                
1 Letter from Schiller to Fichte on June 24th, 1795, GA III/2 : 333. On this topic, see Hartmut 
Traub, “Über die Pflichten des ästhetischen Künstlers.  Der §31 des Systems der Sittenlehre im 
Kontext von Fichtes Philosophie der Ästhetik,” Fichte-Studien 27 (2006), p. 81. 
2 Obviously, Schiller could not have known that in the manuscript of his lectures on the topic of 
the spirit and the letter in philosophy, Fichte had countenanced a genius for “truth” as well as a 
“genius” for virtue alongside artistic genius. See the manuscript of the summer 1794 course: “Ich 
will untersuchen, wodurch Geist vom Buchstaben in der Philosophie überhaupt sich 
unterscheide,” GA II/3 : 303. 
3 Third draft of Fichte’s letter to Schiller on June 24th, 1795, GA III/2: 333. 
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“spirit” and “letter” are hereby employed in a figurative sense. We can thus easily see the point 
of Schiller’s correction, namely that the general spirit of a text and the spirit that produces a work 
of art are clearly two very different things – and that much is indisputable. However, we shall see 
that by focussing on this distinction, Schiller missed Fichte’s point, as Fichte took the spirit/letter 
pair in his title not in its figurative, but on the contrary in its proper sense. Accordingly, the 
“spirit” in his article designates aesthetic or philosophical genius rather than the spirit of a text, 
just as the “letter” is meant in its primary sense, namely a sensible trace, rather than an overly 
close exegesis. As surprising as it may seem, then, the title of Fichte’s article may have been 
signalling a tension between the spirit of the philosopher and the recording of the results of his 
intellectual work by the written sign, in print – such is the reading that I intend to put forward 
here. I will try to show the extent to which Fichte believed transcendental philosophy to be 
refractory to the fossilization of its approach in the written text. What is more, we will see that 
Fichte’s misgivings with regard to philosophical writing form a part of a more general critique of 
the book industry of his time: Fichte alleged that the customs of this industry undermined the 
spread of culture in general and particularly of philosophy. The title of the present article was 
taken from a letter that Fichte sent to J. E. C. Schmidt in September 1798; the sentence is worth 
quoting in full: “The letter is particularly lethal in the Wissenschaftslehre; this may be due partly 
to the nature of this system itself, yet also partly to the status of the letter until now.”4 This 
twofold observation will serve as our guiding thread. Firstly, I will have to show that the very 
particular nature of the Wissenschaftslehre justifies a comparison with the artist’s way of 
working, insofar as both the artist and the philosopher draw from the deepest wells of the spirit 
and consequently face the specific problems tied to the exteriorization of this spirit in the 
phenomenal world. Secondly, I will argue that the “letter” – taken in the proper sense of the term 
– turns out to be the very opposite of the spirit, whether philosophical or aesthetic, as the letter’s 
inertia constantly threatens to neutralise the spirit’s spontaneity.  
The present article therefore concerns the strategy that Fichte developed for 
communicating his own philosophy. The focus, accordingly, will be not on his methodology for 
theoretical speculation, which takes place in foro interno, but rather on his methodology for 
communicating the transcendental philosophy, which must take place in and through the material 
world of the senses. This problem was so crucial to the dissemination and legacy of the 
                                                
4 Letter from Fichte to Johann Ernst Christian Schmidt on September 16th, 1798, GA III/3: 142. 
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Wissenschaftslehre that Fichte granted it his utmost attention. As early as the summer of 1794, 
he devoted his series of popular lectures to the vocation of the scholar. As a matter of fact, the 
lectures on the “spirit and the letter in philosophy” were part of these popular lectures and 
constituted the basis for the text that he would send to Schiller the following year; they were 
devoted to working out the “rules for the study of philosophy” and to warning the apprentice-
philosopher of the danger of becoming a mere Buchstäbler.5 I will be referring to the manuscript 
of these lectures, as this text offers us the advantage of gaining an overview of what the article 
for Die Horen was meant to have looked like in its completed form. Indeed, the spirit and the 
letter are treated from both philosophical and artistic perspectives.  
 
 I should start out by emphasizing that Fichte believed the spirit at the source of the fine 
arts to have such deep affinities with the philosophical spirit that he called upon art to perform a 
propaedeutic function for the transcendental philosophy. This function appears in §31 of the 
System of Ethics, where we are told that the aesthetic dimension enables one to raise oneself to 
the level of philosophy by effecting a transition between the common point of view and the 
transcendental point of view.6 The aesthetic spirit is thus clearly linked to philosophical activity. 
In a letter to von Berger, moreover, Fichte declares outright that both the aesthetic spirit and the 
philosophical spirit occupy the “transcendental point of view.”7 The doubts that Schiller raised in 
his letter about bringing art and philosophy closer together were therefore groundless. And that is 
precisely what he would discover, moreover, in Fichte’s answer to his refusal to publish the 
manuscript. Indeed, Fichte retorted by stressing the tight connection and affinity between the two 
domains: the aesthetic and philosophical forms of spirit are really two “subspecies” of the same 
“genus.”8 And that is how Fichte justified using the aesthetic paradigm for articulating his views 
on the role of spirit in philosophy: despite the specific difference between the two domains, they 
                                                
5 Text of the first lecture on Ueber den Unterschied des Geistes, u. des Buchstabens in der 
Philosophie, GA, II/3: 315. 
6 SS, GA I/5: 307-308. See Petra Lohmann, “Grundzüge der Ästhetik.  Zur Bedeutung der 
Ästhetik für die Wissenschaftslehre anlässlich des Horenstreits,” Jahrbuch des deutschen 
Idealismus 4 (2006), p. 201. 
7 Letter from Fichte to Johann Erich von Berger on October 11th, 1796, GA III/3: 37. 
8 Letter from Fichte to Schiller on June 27th, 1795, GA III/2: 336. 
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both nonetheless partake of the same Geist to the extent that, in both cases, the spirit comes into 
play as a “creative imagination.”9  
 Just as in transcendental philosophy, art has the privilege of producing the representation 
thanks to creative imagination. Unlike the common point of view, therefore, art does not remain 
beholden to the representation of the world as it is given: art can so to speak sever the 
representation from the existing world and modify it as it sees fit. The world thereby created is 
fictional, of course, yet it remains an illusion to which the spectator readily consents. 
Transcendental philosophy, for its part, is also concerned with the production of a world, but in 
its case, it has to produce the world such as it appears to the common point of view. That is, 
transcendental philosophy bears an analogy to the game played by the aesthetic spirit insofar as it 
studies the genesis of the representation of the world by the I: in both cases, a distancing from 
the representation occurs. The difference between the two stems from the fact that the artist, 
unlike the philosopher, does not “know” that he is operating at a transcendental level. Whereas 
the artist is blessed with a “divinatory faculty,” which allows him to create his works according 
to an unconscious law,10 the transcendental philosopher turns towards the interiority of his soul 
and endeavours to lucidly retrace the genesis of experience, i.e., the sum of representations that 
convey a feeling of necessity to the common point of view. Unlike the process of artistic 
creation, therefore, the philosophical procedure is conscious and deliberate, yet it requires just as 
much spirit.  
 It is also in this connection that Fichte declares that the transcendental philosopher must 
not lack “an aesthetic sense”. Obviously, the philosopher is not expected to be artistically 
creative, or to be an artist himself. Yet because he partakes of the spirit in general, he must 
demonstrate a measure of aesthetic sensibility. It is this very disposition, indeed, that allows him  
to regard the representation in itself and for itself, to distance himself from dogmatism of the 
common point of view. The philosopher must be open to the fact that the artist plays with the 
representation and that he produces it freely. This gesture of taking a step back from the facts of 
consciousness, following the example of the artist, is an indispensable prerequisite for 
philosophical activity:  
                                                
9 Fichte, “Ich will untersuchen…,” GA II/3: 298. 
10 Fichte, Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie (text of the article sent to Schiller), GA 
I/6: 339. 
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… thus it shows that the philosopher has to possess an aesthetic sense, i.e. “spirit,” {for 
without this he will not succeed in raising himself to the transcendental viewpoint}.  This 
does not mean that the philosopher must necessarily be a poet or a fine writer or an 
accomplished orator, but he must be animated by the same spirit that, when cultivated, 
serves to develop one aesthetically.  Without this spirit one will never make any headway 
in philosophy, but will trouble oneself with the letters [Buchstaben] of the same without 
penetrating its inner {spirit}.11 
 
The transcendental philosopher is called upon to enter into himself and turn his attention towards 
a sphere that offers nothing stable or fixed. The dynamics that he seeks to describe operate in an 
intuitive sphere, the sphere of intellectual intuition; he concentrates on a pure self-activity. This 
descriptive task can only be discursive, however; the philosopher is forced to rely on the 
“concept,” even if it constitutes what Fichte calls a moment of “rest” (Ruhe),12 a mere stage in 
the complex dynamics of consciousness. Thus, the concept serves as a necessary expedient for 
mapping out processes that remain essentially intuitive. In transcendental philosophy, the life of 
consciousness apprehends and examines itself. Only the philosophical spirit is capable of gaining 
access to this life, because it participates in it. But this in turn gives rise to a formidable problem 
for philosophical discourse: How to describe this process by means of concepts whose referent is 
an inner flux, a pure self-activity? And if the spirit does finally attain the object of transcendental 
philosophy, how will it then succeed in communicating it to other spirits by means of mere 
discourse? The Wissenschaftslehre was unprecedented in several respects, as Fichte was 
perfectly aware, and yet it was condemned to rely on the vocabulary available at the time 
(vorhandene Wörtersprache)13 and to articulate its concepts in words. It should therefore come 
                                                
11 Fichte, WLnm[K], GA IV/2: 266; tr. D. Breazeale, FTP, p. 474.  Here is what Herbart had to 
say about the importance of aesthetic culture for Fichte : “Mangel an Einbildungskraft legt er den 
meisten jetzigen Philosophen zur Last; von den Dichtern hingegen erwartet er sehr viel für seine 
Philosophie. Unter allen Menschen glaubt er bis jetzt von Schillern und Göthe’n sich am besten 
verstanden, die sich sehr mit seinem System beschäftigen. – Seit meinem Umgange mit Fichte’n 
habe ich es recht gefühlt, wie wesentlich die Cultur des ästhetischen Vermögens zur Ausbildung 
des ganzen Menschen gehört.” Letter from J. F. Herbart to G. A. von Halem on August 28th, 
1795, in Fichte im Gespräch I¸ ed. E. Fuchs (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 
1978), p. 300. See Fichte, Vorlesungen über das Wesen des Gelehrten (1811), GA II/12: 342, 
356.  See also Petra Lohmann, “Die Funktionen der Kunst und des Künstlers in der Philosophie 
J. G. Fichtes,” Fichte-Studien 25 (2005), p. 116. 
12 Fichte, Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1797), GA I/4: 280. 
13 Fichte, Sonnenklarer Bericht (1801), GA I/7: 236. 
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as no surprise that the transcendental philosophy enjoins a certain number of precautions in this 
regard, and that its methodology calls for a very particular communication strategy.  
While Schiller was not in possession of all of the information necessary for properly 
judging Fichte’s article at the time he raised his first objection, it is doubtful whether the same 
can be said with respect to his second objection. In consequence, one can at least partly 
understand Fichte’s outrage at the suggestion that the spirit/letter dichotomy had nothing to do 
with his argument, the first three sections of which dealt with the artist’s spirit and genius. As I 
suggested above, Fichte interprets both terms in their proper sense; accordingly, just as the title 
alludes to the “spirit” in philosophy, so must the “letter” in question here be taken for what it is, 
namely a material sign, or more precisely a printed character. And yet Fichte had given Schiller 
two hints in this regard.  
 The first of these hints appears in the form of a simple post-script appended to the letter 
that Fichte sent along with his manuscript, in which he makes the following, trivial-sounding 
remark about his title: “The word ‘letter’, as per its etymology, appears in the title on purpose 
[mit Fleiss].”14 Fichte was hereby requesting Schiller, as the editor of the journal, to keep the 
spelling of the word Buchstab as it appears in the title, even if in German the word is spelled 
Buchstabe and besides should receive a final “-n” here, as it happens to be employed in the 
accusative case – which together would have normally yielded “Ueber Geist und Buchstaben in 
der Philosophie.” Now, if Fichte insists on drawing his reader’s attention to the “etymology” of 
the word, it is because that information contributes decisively to understanding his text. The 
etymology highlights the word Stab, which means stick and by extension the thin, tapering stroke 
on a printed page, while Buch of course designates a collection of printed pages.15 The word 
Buchstab obviously translates as “letter,” which must be understood in its primary sense – 
literally – as an inscription in a book. So Fichte wished to emphasize the materiality of the sign, 
                                                
14 Letter from Fichte to Schiller on June 27th, 1795, GA III/2: 326.   
15 One line of interpretation traces the origin of “Buch” to “Buche” – beech – thus to a heavy and 
hard kind of wood onto which the Runen, i.e., the Stäbchen, were inscribed. Whether one leans 
towards Buch (book) or Buche (beech), however, either reading remains compatible with 
Fichte’s meaning insofar as he wants to emphasize the sign’s materiality. See Trübners deutsches 
Wörterbuch, Volume I (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1939), p. 456; F. Kluge, Etymologisches Wörterbuch 
der deutschen Sprache, 22nd ed. (Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 1989),  p. 111.  
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not the letter in a figurative sense; the nuance is subtle, but nonetheless essential to Fichte’s 
project.  
 The second hint points in the same direction. It can be found in the third section of the 
article. Speaking of the artist’s aesthetic spirit, Fichte recalled that genius must unavoidably 
express itself in a work of art that is of necessity constituted of palpable materials. Here, the 
letter is tightly linked to the concept of a “body”: “This inner mood of the artist is the spirit of his 
products, and the contingent forms through which he expresses it are their body, or their letter.”16 
Clearly, the spirit of the artist is diametrically opposed to the body (Körper) of the work. And it 
is precisely this opposition that the artist has to overcome through his work – an inescapable task 
if he is to communicate his inner state to a spectator. In other words, he is forced to convey his 
inner spiritual life in and through inert matter – inert insofar as it remains entirely heterogeneous 
and indifferent to this spiritual life. This form is hereby a “body” that at first presents itself to 
him as a “a lifeless lump” into which he must breathe movement and vitality capable of 
translating his inner “vibrations”. That is, the “letter” – clearly identified here with the “body” – 
is conceived under the aspect of its materiality as a sign. At play here is the proper sense of the 
letter, thus, a sign that belongs to language, serving to transcribe and preserve the latter’s 
phonetic dimension. The artist can employ it, just as he can also make use of other materials, 
such as colours or musical notes, for realizing his work. The philosopher, by contrast, has 
language, and language alone, at his disposal as a body for communicating his spirituality.  
 We saw above that speculative thought focuses on a pure flux, which it must nevertheless 
seize and capture, so to speak, and this by means of concepts, which are so many handholds for 
grasping the processual flux of intuition. Correspondingly, if the concept is only a stopgap for 
the philosopher, how much more do the words of ordinary language create an obstacle that he 
must overcome in order to communicate his discoveries! Thus Fichte himself admitted that he 
selected his expressions from the resources offered him by existing languages such as German, 
Latin and Greek – resources to be wielded with dexterity. The task of transmitting philosophy is 
not hopeless, however, especially when one can make use of the spoken word. In his summer 
1794 course on the spirit and the letter, Fichte explained to his students that in order to 
communicate with them he would perforce make use of acoustic signs that, in and of themselves, 
                                                
16 Fichte, Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie, GA I/6: 356. See the letter from Fichte 
to Schiller on June 27th, 1795, GA III/2: 337. 
 9 
were nothing more than oscillations of the air emitted by the speaker, empty shells which the 
hearers would in turn have to fill with meaning. Only in this way can one communicate from one 
spirit to another;17 without this effort on the students’ part, without their active participation in 
imbuing the signs with meaning, the latter would effect nothing.  
 And this danger becomes all the greater when the acoustic sign is recorded as a material 
trace – the letter. That is the crucial issue at stake here, and we shall see that its significance 
extends far beyond the immediate context of the lectures and of the article on the spirit and the 
letter in philosophy. Indeed, writing carries the inherent risk that the sign may remain in its 
material state – as a “lifeless body” – without being reanimated by the reader’s consciousness, in 
turn giving the reader the illusion that by possessing the book he also grasps its meaning and its 
truth. The written page fossilizes the spoken language in an immobile and permanent state. The 
product may seem like a deposit, available at any time and even to someone who does not make 
the effort required to bring the letter to life. The Buchstäbler, as characterized by Fichte to his 
students, goes by the letter alone: “So and so said it; it’s printed in such and such a book.”18 It is 
no accident that Fichte referred to the “book” in this connection: it echoes the Buchstab in the 
title and betrays Fichte’s misgivings about print. One can detect, as we shall see next, a certain 
mistrust vis-à-vis the book that manifests itself all throughout his oeuvre.  
 We must now examine more closely how Fichte expressed his misgivings about print 
over the course of his first years in Jena. After all, Fichte published several works during that 
time, including scientific works, and what we find is that all of these published works, even in 
their titles, betray a strong preference for the antidote to the dead letter, namely the live, spoken 
word. For instance, the so-called Programmschrift (1794) bills itself, in the subtitle, as a “text of 
invitation to his lectures on this science.”19 It is surely significant that a writing aiming to 
introduce the Wissenschaftslehre should make very explicit reference to the lectures that Fichte 
                                                
17 Fichte, Ueber den Unterschied des Geistes, u. des Buchstabens in der Philosophie, first 
lecture, GA II/3: 320. 
18 Fichte, Ueber den Unterschied des Geistes, u. des Buchstabens in der Philosophie, third 
lecture, GA II/3: 339. Fichte allows himself a play on words here, in order to take those who are 
unfitted for philosophy to task for being unable to go beyond the sentences. He says that what 
they need are “gesetzte Sätze” – that is, sentences that have been processed by the typographer 
(‘Setzer’) and the printing shop (Druckerey). Letter from Fichte to F. Johannsen on January 31st, 
1801, GA III/5: 9. 
19 Fichte, BWL, GA I/2: 107 (the subtitle was omitted in SW I, p. 27). 
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was preparing to give in Jena, such that the book itself becomes a mere introduction to the 
former. In other words, the genuine Wissenschaftslehre would be expounded in the lectures, 
whereas the short book would serve merely as a preparation.20  
 One could then object that the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 was also published – and 
surely it qualifies as a scientific work. But again, the complete title of the work (including both 
the Grundlage and the Grundriss) reveals the use Fichte envisaged for his printed works: 
“manuscript for my auditors.” The formulation has something intrinsically paradoxical about it: a 
writing for auditors, for listeners. But does this not imply – apparently contrary to the thesis 
being defended here – that the lectures by themselves did not suffice and that they had to be 
supplemented by a text? It is true that Fichte certainly had something like this in mind, for he 
regarded these publications as Lesebücher. However, one must also take account of the full 
justification that Fichte gave to K. A. Böttinger, just before arriving in Jena, regarding the 
printing of the Grundlage in the form of handouts to be distributed over the course of the coming 
weeks: the point of this, Fichte explained, was to counteract the attendees’ lamentable habit of 
taking dictation of everything the professor said, without bothering to think along with him 
                                                
20 Was it merely a coincidence that it was in mid-February of 1794 – i.e., just as Fichte had 
accepted a position as a professor in Jena – that we find, in the lectures given at Lavater’s house 
in Zurich, the first occurrence in his entire oeuvre of the term Wissenschaftslehre to designate 
transcendental philosophy? Do we not hear in Lehre the echo of the verb lehren – to teach, just 
as, in Latin, the verb docere can be heard in doctrina? That correspondence is, after all, the basis 
for the English and French translations, namely “Doctrine of Science” and “doctrine de la 
science” (see W. E. Wright’s introduction to his translation of Fichte, The Science of Knowing.  
J. G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), p. 10). Of 
course, rendering Wissenschaftslehre as “theory of science” would also be faithful to Fichte’s 
intention to the extent that he characterized his enterprise as a “Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften 
überhaupt,” whereby Fichte meant to emphasize the properly scientific status of his philosophy. 
However, nothing prevents us from reading the term Lehre as an indication of the specific 
purpose of this philosophical corpus: Fichte’s new philosophical system was indeed a doctrine, a 
teaching, insofar as it was essentially meant to be taught. During the same period, moreover, 
Fichte described himself as a Lehrer der Philosophie, preparing to take up a Lehramt. Cf. the 
preface of his editors as well as the text BWL, GA I/2: 98, 99, 117, 118. For the first appearance 
of the term “Wissenschaftslehre” in Fichte’s oeuvre, see I. Radrizzani, “La ‘première’ doctrine 
de la science de Fichte.  Introduction et traduction,” Archives de philosophie 60 (1997), p. 627 
note 52.  For the first occurrence of this expression in the correspondence, see Fichte’s letter to 
K. O. Böttiger on March 1st, 1794, GA III/2: 72. On the interrelationship between the doctrine 
and its instruction, see Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1811), GA II/12: 339. 
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(gadankenloses Nachschreiben).21 Needless to say, the utterances thus recorded in the students’ 
notebooks would become dead letters serving, at best, to recall the words that the professor had 
spoken, but without their meaning or their real import, since the student, scribbling furiously, 
would have from the outset withdrawn from the thought process. Rather, the professor’s thought 
process unfolds as an event: it is alive and calls for active listening on the audience’s part. 
Correspondingly, printing handouts on the Wissenschaftslehre was meant to obviate incessant 
note-taking and to thereby free up the students for such active listening. Fichte’s choice of the 
term “Handschrift” to refer to these handouts further emphasizes that he conceived of the 
Vorlesung as a live event. While the Grundlage published over the course of the successive 
lectures actually appeared in print, it was nonetheless essentially a manuscript in the sense that it 
reminded the reader of the provisional, unfinished character of the text and of the closeness of 
the “hand” of the person who had written it. Accordingly, the author had to flesh out such a 
manuscript with oral explanations, otherwise it would remain of minimal use – and that is 
precisely how Fichte viewed the handouts on the Wissenschaftslehre to be distributed at each 
lecture. 
 Indeed, Fichte was so conscious of this contextual and specific dimension of the 
Handschrift that he took special measures to ensure a certain control over the distribution of his 
printed texts from the outset. Since they were specifically meant for his lecture audience, he 
wanted to tightly restrict their distribution outside of the lecture hall to only those people able to 
make proper use of them. Such was his initial intention, at least: Niethammer, who met Fichte 
upon his arrival in Jena relates that the new professor intended “to have a primer [Lehrbuch] for 
his lectures on theoretical and practical philosophy printed; for the time being, however, this 
primer must neither appear in the bookstore, nor be sold to anyone besides those who attend his 
lectures [seine Zuhörer].”22 None of this was lost on Goethe, moreover, who saw that the texts 
                                                
21 Letter from Fichte to K. A. Bottiger on January 1st, 1974, GA III/2: 71.  See the preface to the 
second edition of BWL, GA I/2: 162: “… der bis jetzt gewählte einen festen Buchstaben 
vermeidende Vortrag [scheint], als der innere Geist dieser Lehre sie gegen gedankenlose 
Nachsprecher zu schützen.”  See also Wissenschaftslehre 1804 (Zweiter Vortrag), GA II/8: 25. 
22 Letter from F. I. Niethammer to F. P. von Herbert on June 2nd, 1794, in Fichte im Gespräch I, 
p. 111: Fichte intends “ein Lehrbuch zu seinen Vorlesungen über theoretische u. praktische 
[Philosophie] drucken zu lassen; vor der Hand aber solle dies Lehrbuch nicht in den Buchhandel 
kommen, u. an niemand als an seine Zuhörer verkauft werden.” See the letter from Fichte to K. 
A. Böttiger on March 1st, 1794, GA III/2: 72. 
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that Fichte was handing out over the course of the semester were still rather rough drafts which 
absolutely had to be supplemented by a commentary, better still an oral commentary. Here is 
what he writes to Charlotte von Kalb on June 28th, 1794: “I am not sending you any of Fichte’s 
philosophical handouts; if you want to get any idea of their content, then an oral presentation [ein 
mündlicher Vortrag] will be absolutely necessary.”23 Goethe therefore understood the nature and 
purpose of Fichte’s “manuscript” very well: the text cannot acquire its full meaning unless it is 
accompanied by a running commentary that breathes life into each of the steps of the reasoning 
that it records.   
This tug of war between scripturality and orality allows us to discern an important aspect 
of Fichte’s attitude towards philosophical language. Clearly, writing offers the considerable 
advantage of recording the ideas of the Wissenschaftslehre by means of material signs. However, 
only by speaking live in front of an audience can the professor breathe life into his reasoning and 
adjust it according to the audience’s reactions. Thus Fichte had to satisfy two demands. On the 
one hand, since he regarded his Wissenschaftslehre as the definitive system of philosophy, it 
seemed advisable to preserve it for the ages by recording it once and for all, with the greatest 
terminological precision that writing affords. On the other hand, he recognized that this science 
had not yet attained a definitive form and furthermore that its audience still required the 
continuous assistance of a guide. One should not be surprised, therefore, to discover a tension in 
Fichte’s thought between the search for a fixed terminology for the Wissenschaftslehre and the 
simultaneous desire to avoid prematurely setting the transcendental philosophy’s vocabulary in 
stone. 
 At the very beginning of 1794, Fichte realised that he would eventually have to construct 
a “philosophical language” by restricting the semantic field of ordinary language and coining 
new terms when the need arose. While he certainly envisaged such a Zeichensystem seriously, it 
would be truer to say that he viewed it more as the crowning of his philosophical enterprise than 
as a complete system of signs at his disposal from the start.24 Fichte found himself forced to 
provisionally rely on the resources afforded him by the existing language in order to execute his 
task. In a letter to his wife in 1795, for instance, he disclosed that not a single “letter” of the 
                                                
23 This letter of Goethe’s can be found in Fichte im Gespräch I, p. 127. 
24 Letter from Fichte to A. H. Schütz on January 15th, 1794, GA III/2: 50.  See also Sonnenklarer 
Bericht, GA I/7 : 237. 
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philosophical system that he had developed up to that point ought to be considered definitive.25 
An important concern of his at this time was to avoid any fixation of his thought in a definitive 
idiom. Accordingly, he cautioned Herbart about the “letter” of the primers that he had already 
published, enjoining him to step back from the letter of the text and to consider the questions in 
their relation to the whole. Herbart, for his part, was surprised to note just how greatly Fichte 
distanced himself from his own writings in 1795, barely a year after their publication.26 
Moreover, this provisional and changeable character of philosophical terminology offered the 
further advantage of providing the surest means for confounding those who endeavoured no 
more than to parrot back what they heard (Nachbeter).27 The professor’s free and changing 
lecturing discouraged the audience from attending solely to the words; conversely, he could 
monitor the genuinely interested students, detect when they became puzzled, and address their 
confusion by reformulating the question in various ways. In his Attempt at a New Presentation of 
the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte affirmed that : “In keeping with my academic post, I first wrote 
for my auditors, a situation which enabled me to explain myself orally until I was understood.”28 
There is indeed a considerable advantage to presenting this system ‘live’, since it is, and can only 
be, the fruit of the philosophical spirit, an essentially vivifying force. Without a doubt, the voice 
represented the best means for communicating the Wissenchaftslehre, as it is no prisoner of the 
printed word. Marie Johanne Fichte attested that her husband never gave the same course twice 
from one semester to the next, quoting his conviction that he could make his 
presentations “livelier” by renewing his approach and keeping it  “fresh.”29 This attitude resulted 
from an entirely conscious decision on Fichte’s part, as he believed it to be the instructor’s duty 
to constantly renew the form of his oral presentations. Orality thus gave the inventor of the 
Wissenschaftslehre the opportunity to ‘sound out’ his audience and to adjust his teaching 
                                                
25 Post-script of a letter from Fichte to Marie Johanne Fichte in September, 1795, GA III/2 : 409. 
26 “Zudem scheint er wenig an dem, was er einmal geschrieben, zu hängen; selbst in Ansehung 
der Wissenschaftslehre, deren erste Bogen kaum ein Jahr alt sind, warnt er mich, nicht an den 
Buchstaben des Einzelnen zu kleben, sondern alles aus dem Gesichtspuncte des Ganzen 
anzusehn.” Letter from Herbart to Halem on 28 August 28th, 1795, in Fichte im Gespräch I, p. 
300. 
27 Fichte, BWL, GA I/2: 162. 
28 Fichte,  Neue Darstellung, GA I/4: 183. 
29 See Marie Johanne Fichte in Fichte im Gespräch I, p. 97. 
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accordingly – an essential component of effective communication.30 Fichte therefore constantly 
monitored how his audience was progressing, to the point that he sometimes concluded that the 
latter was unfitted for receiving the new philosophy31 – a circumstance due partly to the 
particular nature of the Wissenschaftslehre, but also more generally to the “characteristics of the 
present age.”  
 Lastly, if we examine the popular lectures bearing this title, we find that Fichte adopted a 
broader perspective on the contemporary situation of humanity, which in turn has bearing on the 
question we have been pursuing, namely the identification of factors that could explain the 
reading public’s indifference vis-à-vis the new philosophy. According to these lectures, 
humanity in Fichte’s day found itself in a stage characterized by the unbridled affirmation of 
individuality and the reign of the arbitrary; furthermore, the culture centred on the book played 
no small role in reinforcing this tendency. The sixth lecture attempts to demonstrate that the 
public’s lack of receptivity stems from the ubiquity of books and the habits that this 
pervasiveness creates in the individual. More precisely, the habit of reading leads to a purely 
passive, insouciant attitude, which replaces the alertness and concentration required by oral 
discourse. As a result, the preconditions for effective oral communication and a fortiori for the 
transmission of the Wissenschaftslehre were lacking. Fichte blamed the reading culture of his 
own time for destroying the predispositions required for an effective oral presentation. 
                                                
30 Oral presentation offers the advantage of always taking account of the context 
(Zusammenhang) in which the communication takes place; on this point see Ueber das Wesen 
des Gelehrten, (1805), GA I/8: 130 : “Der Schriftsteller mag nur Eine Form für seine Idee 
besitzen ; ist diese Form nur vollkommen, so hat er seiner Pflicht Genüge gethan: der 
akademische Lehrer soll eine Unendlichkeit von Formen besitzen, und ihm kommt es nicht 
darauf an, dass er die vollkommene Form finde, sondern dass er die in jedem Zusammenhange 
passendste finde.” See ibid. GA I/8: 130.  
31 For instance, notice how he presents the situation in a letter on January 3rd, 1804 addressed to 
the Royal Cabinet of Berlin: “Der Erfinder, durch seine vieljährige Beobachtung des 
sogenannten literarischen Publikums sattsam überzeugt, dass durch die bisherige Weise des 
Studirens die Bedingungen des Verständnisses eines solchen Systems grössentheils verlohren 
gegangen, auch dass gerade jetzo eine grössere Menge Irrungsstoff sich im allgemeinen Umlaufe 
befindet, als vielleicht je, -  ist nicht gesonnen, seine Entdeckung in ihrer dermaligen Form durch 
den Druck dem allgemeinen Missverständnis, und Verdrehung Preis zu geben.  Er will sich auf 
mündliche Mittheilung beschränken, indem hiebei das Missverständnis auf der Stelle erscheinen, 
und gehoben werden kann.” GA III/5: 223. 
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Furthermore, this tendency went against the nature of things, as he saw it, whereby the spoken 
word ought to have precedence over the letter:  
  
Hence verbal communication, by continuous discourse or scientific conversation, 
possesses infinite advantage over the communication through the mere dead letter;   
writing was invented by the Ancients only in order to replace such spoken instruction to 
those who had no access to it; everything that was written had in the first place been 
verbally communicated, and was but a copy of the spoken discourse. Only with the 
Moderns, especially since the invention of the printing press, has the printed word aimed 
at becoming autonomous, and this entailed among other things that style, deprived of the 
correction of the living speech, has fallen into such decline. But the reader just described 
has already been spoiled even for such verbal communication.32 
 
Since Gutenberg’s press, the ersatz had supplanted the original and become the norm. But Fichte 
would not give in. Instead, he outlined plans for reversing this tendency, including teaching the 
younger generation a new, far more active and critical way of reading, cultivating the “method of 
oral communication” among educators, and fostering dispositions conducive to this mode of 
communication among his audience. Nor was this all just wishful thinking on Fichte’s part: on 
several occasions he considered founding institutes devoted to cultivating the art of speaking, 
and during the last years of his life he was planning to found an institute for professors.33 
Furthermore, he is known to have taken an interest in pedagogy from very early on, pursuing it 
throughout his entire career.34 In philosophy, he was drawn to the primacy of orality over 
                                                
32 Fichte, Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, GA I/8: 263. And just below Fichte adds: 
“Wenn er [today’s reader] es nur, schwarz auf weiss gesetzt, an seinen Augen halten könnte, 
dann, meint er, wäre ihm geholfen.  Aber er täuscht sich.  Auch sodann würde er die Perioden 
nicht als Einheit geistig fassen; sondern nur das Auge würde auf dem Umfange, den er einnimmt, 
ruhen, und ihn fortdauernd auf dem Papiere, und vermittelst des Papiers, festhalten, so dass er 
nun glaubte, Er fasse ihn.”  
33 Fichte, Einleitung in seine philosophische Vorlesungen, October 1810, in Die späten 
wissenschaftlichen Vorlesungen I, 1809-1811, ed. H. G. von Manz et al. (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000), p. 225. 
34 I am referring to his association with Pestalozzi during his stay in Switzerland, for instance, as 
well as to his numerous writings on the university as an institution and on the method for 
academic studies. See my previous articles on these topics, including “La Staatslehre de 1813 et 
la question de l’éducation chez Fichte,” in Fichte. La philosophie de la maturité (1804-1814), 
Réflexivité, phénoménologie et philosophie, ed. J.-C Goddard and M. Maesschalck (Paris : Vrin, 
2003), pp. 159-174 ; “Fichte, Schleiermacher and W. von Humboldt on the Foundation of the 
University of Berlin,” in Fichte, German Idealism and Early Romanticism, ed. D. Breazeale and 
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scripturality among the Ancients and would occasionally evoke Pythagoras’ intellectual 
community, although he remained strongly partial to the Socratic approach, with its active 
method centred on dialogue. And while classes as they were given at the modern university 
tended to make such exchanges between the professor and students difficult, Fichte proposed 
concrete measures to address this problem, notably the Conversatorium, where the student could 
conduct an exchange of questions and responses with the teacher and thereby enter into a 
genuine dialogue.35  
  
 We have seen that the philosophical spirit must rely on a form, on a sensible 
concretisation in the world of the senses that translates the inner thought process at the basis of 
transcendental philosophy. Just as the artist strives to produce a finished (vollendet)36 work and, 
in order to do so, is forced to go through the mediation of a material suitable for adequately 
expressing the aesthetic spirit, so does the philosopher seek to attain the faithful presentation of 
his spiritual approach and to give it a lasting form that can be passed on to future generations. 
The privilege of the philosopher, however, is that his approach can be articulated discursively, 
which in turn allows him to make his reasoning explicit and to guide the novice by means of oral 
explanations. Thus on the one hand, Fichte sought a definitive literary form, the ultimate “letter,” 
for recording the Wissenschaftslehre and ensuring its future transmission. On the other hand, 
considering the character of his own age, he felt the need to direct the apprentice’s initiation into 
this work of the spirit by means of oral communication. The spoken word’s greater affinity with 
the spirit, together with dialogue’s ability to foster this initiation, seemed to Fichte to offer the 
philosopher an undeniable advantage over the artist, as the latter is not licensed to provide 
                                                                                                                                                       
T. Rockmore (Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2010), p. 371-386. See also G. Cecchinato, 
“Fichtes Ästhetik. Eigene Reflexionen über Kunst und Wissenchaftslehre,” Fichte-Studien 32 
(2009), p. 160-168; P. L. Oesterreich, “Fichte und die Kunst des Philosophierens,” Fichte-
Studien 32 (2009), p. 150-160. 
35 On the Socratic method of teaching, see Fichte, Deduzierter Plan einer zu Berlin zu 
errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt (1807), GA II/11: 88-89.  For Fichte’s references to 
Pythagoras’ community, see Fichte, Philosophie der Maurerei. Briefe an Konstant, 13th Letter, 
GA I/8: 454; Xavier Léon, Fichte et son temps II/1 (Paris : Armand Colin, 1958), p. 40, 55. 
36 Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie, GA I/6: 359.  Here is how Fichte characterizes 
the well-executed artwork: “In den Werken der letzteren [Künstler] sind Geist und Körper, wie 
in der Werkstätte der Natur, innigst zusammengeflossen, und das volle Leben geht bis in die 
äussersten Theile.” 
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commentary on his own work or to specify how it ought to be received. Besides, the 
prerequisites for the reception of artworks were no different than those holding for philosophy. 
In a letter sent to Schiller in the summer of 1795, Fichte bemoaned the habits of his 
contemporaries, who expected the work of art to be undemanding and would therefore be unable 
to appreciate works of a genius such as Goethe.    
 Thus, Fichte was loath to give up the dialogue with his students, thereby losing this 
advantage. In the preface to the second edition (1798) to the Programmschrift, he announced his 
intention to take account of the concrete situation of his time in presenting the 
Wissenschaftslehre and assigned himself the corresponding tasks of remoulding the habits of his 
contemporaries and of guiding them along the path of the one and true philosophy.37 His 
departure from the University of Jena must have constituted an abrupt and untimely interruption, 
therefore, and so one must not underestimate just how great a rupture the Atheism Dispute 
brought about. In reality, this resignation/dismissal did not just entail the loss of Fichte’s 
livelihood, but also represented a break in his way of philosophizing, as before then he had 
always complemented his thinking, especially the transcendental philosophy, with lectures and 
communicated it through that medium. Needless to say, Fichte could surely have relied on his 
great fame and led a peaceful existence in Berlin as a writer; the circumstance that in 1800 the 
city still lacked a university would have been of no great consequence, as he could easily have 
continued his work independently, living by his pen. But Fichte refused to resign himself to such 
a fate and fought it with all his strength.38 In fact, we can see that he obviously needed to 
                                                
37 “Für die Vollendung des Systems ist noch unbeschreiblich viel zu thun.  Es ist jetzt kaum der 
Grund gelegt, kaum ein Anfang des Baues gemacht; und der Verf. will alle seine bisherige 
Arbeiten nur für vorläufige gehalten wissen.  Die feste Hoffnung, die er nunmehr fassen kann, 
nicht, wie er vorher befürchtete, auf gutes Glück, in der individuellen Form, in der es sich ihm 
zuerst darbot, für irgend ein künftiges Zeitalter, das ihn verstehen dürfte, in todten Buchstaben, 
sein System niederlegen zu müssen, sondern schon mit seinen Zeitgenossen, sich darüber zu 
verständigen, und zu berathen, dasselbe durch gemeinschaftliche Bearbeitung mehrerer eine 
allgemeinere Form gewinnen zu sehen, und es lebendig im Geiste und der Denkart des Zeitalters 
zu hinterlassen, ändert den Plan, den er sich bei der ersten Ankündigung vorschrieb.  Er wird 
nähmlich in der systematischen Ausführung des Systems vor jetzt nicht weiter fortschreiten, 
sondern erst das bis jetzt erfundene vielseitiger darstellen, und vollkommen klar, und jedem 
unbefangenen evident zu machen suchen.”  Fichte, BWL, GA I/2: 162-163. 
38 If Fichte opposed his students’ obsession with writing down every single word, it is because 
they thereby confined the professor to the role of a mere writer: “…wo der Lehrer sich bestrebt, 
recht lebendig und dem Zuhörer gleichsam in die Seele hinein zu reden, da ist er [the student 
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communicate the fruits of his ongoing labours on the Wissenschaftslehre to an audience and that 
he cared about his listeners’ reactions to his lectures. Did he not confess that the only worthwhile 
comments that he ever received on the Wissenschaftslehre were invariably made by the 
“auditors” who attended his courses?39  
  Immediately following his departure from Jena, he urgently needed to reconnect with an 
audience if not to get back to teaching as soon as possible. From Berlin, he wrote the following 
to his wife, who had stayed behind: “If I could have a guarantee that I would be allowed to spend 
my days here quietly, with a certain dignity, and especially to give lectures, then I would have a 
good mind to stay here for a few years.”40 His desire to return to teaching as quickly as possible 
even surprised Jacobi, whom Fichte had requested to intercede on his behalf in order to get him a 
position. Indeed, Jacobi was taken aback at what he regarded as Fichte’s pure presumption in 
asking him not only to find some work fir him, but on top of that to land him a position as a 
“professor,” at the University of Heidelberg, for example. But for Fichte, the latter request was 
motivated not by social status, but rather by a vital necessity, as it were – at least for the future of 
the Wissenschaftslehre. Indeed, how else to explain his eagerness to join the Royal-York Lodge 
soon after his arrival in Berlin, if not in order to pursue his philosophical work under more-or-
less acceptable conditions? Were the Free Masons not a prime audience? We can easily see why 
he quickly attained the rank of “Grand Orator” of the Lodge, a position on which he wished to 
maintain a firm hold. To be sure, his initiative in the Lodge would soon lead to a clash that drove 
him to resign. But let us not forget that from outset he secretly nourished a plan to use his status 
as orator to disseminate the Wissenschaftslehre to this elite audience! Varnhagen von Ense 
attests to as much about a conversation he had with Fichte.41 But these efforts remained in vain, 
and as a result, for the many years before finally regaining his status as a university professor, 
                                                                                                                                                       
who writes everything down] nur geschäftig, das Lebendige gleich wieder in ein todtes Bild des 
Lebendigen zu verwandeln.  Was er dadurch erhält, ist doch im günstigsten Falle nur ein Buch; 
wäre Ihnen aber das genug, so wollte ich zu Hause bleiben und Ihnen Bücher schreiben, und Sie 
könnten auch zu Hause bleiben, um sie da zu lesen.”  Einleitung in seine philosophische 
Vorlesungen, Oktober 1810, p. 224. 
39 Fichte, Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (1797), GA I/4: 184. 
40 Letter from J. G. Fichte to Marie Johanne Fichte on July 20th, 1799, GA III/4: 16. 
41 X. Léon, Fichte et son temps II/1, p. 32, 53, 55. 
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Fichte found that the only way that he could continue to lecture on the Wissenschaftslehre was to 
convene an audience in his own living room.  
 
      Translated from the French by Adam Westra 
